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Abstract. We present a novel malware detection approach based on
metrics over quantitative data flow graphs. Quantitative data flow graphs
(QDFGs) model process behavior by interpreting issued system calls as
aggregations of quantifiable data flows. Due to the high abstraction level
we consider QDFG metric based detection more robust against typical
behavior obfuscation like bogus call injection or call reordering than other
common behavioral models that base on raw system calls. We support
this claim with experiments on obfuscated malware logs and demonstrate
the superior obfuscation robustness in comparison to detection using n-
grams. Our evaluations on a large and diverse data set consisting of about
7000 malware and 500 goodware samples show an average detection rate
of 98.01% and a false positive rate of 0.48%. Moreover, we show that
our approach is able to detect new malware (i.e. samples from malware
families not included in the training set) and that the consideration of
quantities in itself significantly improves detection precision.
1 Introduction
Despite the increasing availability and deployment of intrusion detection systems
and anti-virus engines, malicious software (malware) remains a severe threat.
One reason is the steadily increasing sophistication of modern malware. Most
new malware families found in the wild employ some kind of functionality to
avoid or harden detection by traditional security measures. Examples range from
rather simplistic attempts to disable known security software upon infection;
over polymorphism and metamorphism techniques to alter and obfuscate the
executable binaries of malware in order to harden detection by signature-based
approaches; up to more sophisticated behavioral obfuscation techniques, such as
mimicry attacks, that aim at altering the runtime behavior to trick behavior-
based detection approaches [35].
One challenge of malware detection research is thus the new threat of stealthy
and obfuscated malware; and how to counteract their attempts to avoid detec-
tion and remain “below the radar”. We contribute towards this goal with a novel
behavior-based malware detection methodology which we show to be less prone
to circumvention by obfuscation mechanisms. The idea is to discriminate ma-
licious from benign processes by analyzing their behavior in terms of induced
quantitative data flows between system resources. We interpret the execution of
system calls, e.g. a process calling the Windows API ReadFile function to read
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data from a file, as causing a quantifiable flow of data from one system entity,
in this example a file, to another entity, in this example a process.
We aggregate the set of data flow events in a system within a specific time
interval into so-called quantitative data flow graphs (QDFGs). These represent
the interaction between all system entities within this time frame. QDFGs are
abstractions of a system’s behavior in terms of data flows, and thus can be used
for behavior-based malware detection. On the basis of this model our approach
aims at identifying QDFG nodes that refer to potentially malicious processes.
To do so, we use metrics inspired by research done in the area of social network
analysis, to profile typical data flow behavior of benign and malicious processes,
and then use these profiles to train a machine learning classifier.
In contrast to related work on graph-based malware detection [32,9,13,12],
we do not rely on fixed detection patterns and expensive subgraph isomorphism
checks. Instead, we perform approximate similarity comparison of unknown pro-
cess behavior with a more flexible metric-based quantitative data flow model.
By this, in contrast to isomorphism-based approaches that are challenged if mal-
ware does not exactly match defined patterns or models, we are able to detect
unknown or obfuscated malware. In contrast to recently published metric-based
approaches [16,22] we incorporate quantitative data flow aspects into our model
which we show to provide better detection precision and superior obfuscation
resilience, as well as novel features (which we call local).
Contributions: a) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to combine
quantitative data flow tracking with machine learning for checking for behavioral
similarity of processes in the context of malware detection. b) Our experiments
demonstrate the utility of quantitative data flow aspects for detection precision.
In particular we show that the consideration of quantities in data flow graphs
can effectively halve false positive and false negative rates. d) Our evaluations
indicate that our approach is more robust against common types of behavioral
obfuscation than approaches that build on raw system calls such as n-gram based
approaches and e) We show that we are able to detect samples from unknown
malware families with good accuracy.
Organization: We recap an abstract QDFG model from the literature in
§2. We present graph metrics and their semantic relevance in terms of malware
detection in §3.1; describe the training phase in §3.2; and discuss the detec-
tion procedure in §3.3. We evaluate effectiveness, obfuscation robustness, and
efficiency in §4. We put our approach in context in §5. We conclude with a
discussion of capabilities, limitations, and future work in §6.
2 Preliminaries
We first recap some preliminaries. For the subsequent sections we assume a basic
understanding of the Windows NT operating system architecture.
2.1 Quantitative Data Flow Model
We study the identification of potentially malicious processes in a system by
analyzing quantitative data flow graphs (QDFGs) that represent a system’s data
flow activities within a certain period of time. To this end, we use a slightly
simplified generic quantitative data flow graph model from the literature [32].
This model uses QDFGs to capture all aggregated and quantified data flows
between interesting entities in a system, such as processes, files, or sockets. These
are represented by nodes (N). Labeled directed edges (E) between two nodes
intuitively reflect that there has been a transfer of a certain amount of data.
A QDFG is a graph in the set G = N×E×A×((N∪E)×A→ ValueA), where
N denotes the set of all possible nodes, E ⊆ N × N the set of possible edges
between two nodes, and a set of labeling functions ((N∪E)×A)→ ValueA assign
defined values from the set ValueA to an attribute a ∈ A of a node or an edge.
These labeling functions are needed to annotate nodes and edges with additional
information such as amount of transferred data (size ∈ N) or corresponding set
of time stamps (time ∈ 2N).
QDFGs are incrementally built on the basis of data flow relevant system
events, e.g. functions to read data from a file or to write data to a socket. These
events are modeled as a set E . In an actual system, they are intercepted by
runtime monitors which interpret the data flow semantics and perform corre-
sponding graph updates such as the creation or modification of nodes or edges.
One QDFG G = (N,E,A, λ) ∈ G describes all data flow activities of a sys-
tem that happened during a certain time interval. The labeling function λ maps
attributes of an edge or a node to their assigned values.
Events (src, dst, size, t, λ) ∈ E represent transfers of size ∈ N units of data
from a node src ∈ N to a node dst ∈ N with a timestamp t ∈ N and a labeling
function λ for additional information on the corresponding data flow. To ease
presentation, we will not always cleanly distinguish between an event and its
corresponding edge. We are not interested in exactly which event causes which
amount of data flow between two system entities. We thus simplify our model
by aggregating semantically related data flows between pairs of nodes through
summation of the size attribute of the respective edges rather than creating one
distinct edge per event.
Before formally defining the corresponding graph update function, triggered
by the execution of a data flow related event, we first need to introduce some
auxiliary notations and syntactic sugar: For (x, a) ∈ (N ∪ E) × A, we define
λ[(x, a)← v] = λ′ with λ′(y) =
{
v if y ∈ dom(λ)
λ(y) otherwise
.
We furthermore introduce some syntactic sugar for updating labeling func-
tions: λ[(x1, a1)← v1; . . . ; (xk, ak)← vk] = (. . . (λ[(x1, a1)← v1]) . . . )[(xk, ak)← vn].
Correspondingly we denote the composition of two labeling functions by:
λ1 ◦ λ2 = λ1[(x1, a1)← v1; . . . ; (xk, ak)← vn]
where vi = λ2(xi, ai) and (xi, ai) ∈ dom(λ2). Finally, the QDFG update function
update : G × E → G is formally defined in Figure 1.
For later definitions of node features, we need to introduce auxiliary func-
tions. Function pre : N × G → 2N computes all immediate predecessor nodes of
update(G, (src, dst, s, t, λ′)) =

N,
E,
A ∪ dom(λ′),
λ
[
(e, size)← λ(e, size) + s;
(e, time)← (λ(e, time) ∪ {t})
]
◦ λ′
 if e ∈ E

N ∪ {src, dst},
E ∪ {e},
A ∪ dom(λ′),
λ
[
(e, size)← s;
(e, time)← {t}
]
◦ λ′
 otherwise
where e = (src, dst) and G = (N,E,A, λ)
Fig. 1: Graph update function
a node of the graph. Functions in, out : N×G → 2E compute the set of incoming
and outgoing edges of a node.
2.2 Windows Instantiation
To instantiate the abstract QDFG model for real-world malware detection, we
need to map it to resources and events in actual execution environments. In this
paper, the execution environment is that of typical Windows operating systems.
We identified a set of system resources that are relevant for malware data
flow behavior: Processes interact with all other relevant system entities in a way
that they are either sources or sinks of flows from or to other Registry, Socket or
Process nodes. To type these nodes we introduce a special type ∈ A attribute:
Process nodes have type P, File nodes F, Socket nodes S, URL nodes U, and
Registry nodes R.
In addition to entities, we also need to map all data flow relevant events.
These are all Windows API functions that lead to a flow of data between the
above system entities. This includes functions to interact with resources from
the file system like ReadFile or WriteFile to functions to send or receive data to
or from a socket like the Winsock recv and send functions. To give an intuition
how the data flow semantics of such functions is formally modeled, we present
two sample function definitions:
– ReadFile Using this function a process reads a specified amount of bytes from a
file to its memory. Relevant Parameters: Calling Process (PC), Source File (FS),
ToReadBytes (SR). Mapping : (FS , PC , SR, t, λ(FS , size) :=λ(FS , size) + SR)) ∈ E .
– WriteFile Using this function a process can write a specific number of bytes to a file.
Relevant Parameters: Calling Process (PC), Destination File (FD), ToWriteBytes
(SW ). Mapping : (PC , FD, SW , t, λ(FD, size) :=λ(FD, size) + SW )) ∈ E .
Fig. 2: Excerpt of QDFG for a system infected with Cleaman.
For brevity’s sake we only presented two functions here to demonstrate the
general procedure of mapping concrete system events to abstract events of the
QDFG model. A more comprehensive list can be found for instance in [32].
To motivate the utility of this model for malware detection, Figure 2 ex-
emplarily visualizes a typical malware QDFG, built by applying the previously
mentioned model on the intercepted activities of an executed Cleaman trojan.
The size of the edges in the graph visualization represents the relative amount
of transferred data with respect to all other edges of that graph. The type of the
nodes is denoted by the first letter of the node label. By focusing on the part of
the graph with the highest amount of transferred data one can easily spot the
core malign activities of the analyzed malware, i.e. self-replication, or download
and execution of additional malicious payload from a remote server.
3 Approach
Our core idea is to learn statistical profiles for benign and malicious nodes in
QDFGs that represent known infected and non-infected systems. We later use
these profiles for matching feature sets of unknown processes against them.
The overall architecture is depicted in Figure 3. Dashed lines mark compo-
nents and interactions that are only used in the training phase. Dotted lines
refer to the ones only relevant for detection.
3.1 Features
Like others [16,22] we see a strong analogy between social networks and (Q)DFGs
and hence use graph characteristics inspired from social network analysis [25,5].
Nodes in a social network typically represent communicating entities, and the
edges between them their interaction in form of exchanged messages or friendship
relations. Analogously, nodes in our graphs represent system entities and the
edges between them their interaction in form of data flows.
The following features were selected using both an inductive and a deduc-
tive approach. The inductive selection was done based on a preliminary analysis
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Fig. 3: Architecture
of graphs of a small set of malware-infected systems where we applied several
standard metrics from statistics and graph theory and tried to correlate mal-
ware activities with the applied metrics. The deductive selection was performed
through an analysis of standard graph metrics. For each analyzed feature we
tried to correlate its intuition with typical malware behavior or properties. For
instance, malware that tries to infect other processes or files results in a high
connectivity of the corresponding node to certain types of other nodes.
Features are functions φ ∈ Φ that map a QDFG node to a real number:
φ : N × G → R. We enrich the QDFG model to store the value of features
as attributes of nodes n in graph G, so λ(n, φ) = φ(n,G). Additionally, we
distinguish between two basic types of graph features, local features (Φl) and
global features (Φg). Local features have a single-hop scope. This means that
they only capture the relationship of a node with its direct neighbors. Global
features in contrast have a multi-hop scope and represent relationships of one
node with all other nodes of a graph.
As opposed to recently published metric-based approaches [16,22], that also
exploit graph-theoretical properties to derive discriminating features, we take
into account quantitative data flow aspects by exploiting the additional infor-
mation given by the weighted edges of QDFGs.
Local Features (Φl) To define the features, we need some auxiliary notation.
Function dψ : (N ×N × G)→ R with ψ returns the shortest path between two
nodes in a graph, where ψ : E → R with ψ(e) = λ(e, size) defines the edge
distance, or cost, i.e. the amount of data transferred via this edge.
1. Entropy φ1 ∈ Φl computes the normalized entropy of the distribution of edge
feature values such as size, event count, or sensitivity of all outgoing edges of a
process node n ∈ N . The entropy captures the uniformity of the distribution
of percental flows, number of contributing events, or relative sensitivity of all
outgoing edges of a node n.
Rationale: Viruses like Parite infect other executable binaries or processes
by injecting or appending their own binary image. The respective subgraphs
tend to have a comparably uniform distribution of specific features of outgoing
edges, because the majority of triggered events by that malware are targeted
at the infection with roughly the same size of the events as consequence of
them relating to reading or writing the same binary image.
Computation: Let −→s = (s1, . . . , sk) and ei ∈ out(n) in si = ψ(ei)∑
e′∈out(n)
ψ(e′) .
Then we define: φ1(n,G) := NE (−→s ) where NE (−→s ) :=
−
k∑
i=1
si∗log(si)
log(k) .
2. Variance φ2 ∈ Φl expresses the statistical population variance of the distri-
bution of a certain edge feature for all outgoing edges of a node n ∈ N . A
low statistical variance indicates that most of the elements of the distribution
elements are close to the statistical mean, whereas a high variance indicates a
spread of elements. Due to its similar focus on uniformity of underlying input
distributions, the variance feature is closely correlated with the entropy fea-
ture. First evaluations indicated, however, that the entropy metric performed
comparably badly if a node has only a few outgoing edges, but better for
larger sets of outgoing edges. The variance metric seemed to exhibit exactly
the inverse characteristics.
Rationale: The motivation is similar to that for entropy: malware often ex-
hibits outgoing edge distribution characteristics different from benign ones.
Computation:
φ2(n,G) :=
∑
e∈out(n)
(
ψ(e)− 1|out(n)|
∑
e′∈out(n) ψ(e
′)
)
|out(n)|
3. Flow Proportion φ3t ∈ Φl captures the proportion of a certain type of out-
going data flows of a node n ∈ N w.r.t. all outgoing flows of that node. The
type of a flow is determined by the target node’s type of the outgoing edge.
We define different variants of the proportion feature that consider different
edge attributes.
Rationale: Malware processes often exhibit different flow proportion charac-
teristics than goodware. Examples include ransomware or virus processes that
have an irregularly high percentage of outgoing edges that point to file nodes,
as they either encrypt several sensitive files, or infect all executable binary
files on the hard disk.
Computation: Let t ∈ {Process,Registry ,File,Socket}.
φ3t (n,G) :=
∑
e=(src,dst)∈out(n),λ(dst,type)=t
ψ(e)∑
e∈out(n)
ψ(e)
Global Features (Φg) Global features represent the relation between one node
and—possibly all—other nodes of a graph. In contrast to local features, capture
the importance of one node within the overall graph. Note that a crucial feature
of global features is the fact that the weight of edges (given by the size of data
flows between them) is considered when computing the shortest path between
nodes (given by the function ψ(e)).
1. Closeness Centrality φ4 ∈ Φg for a node n ∈ N represents the inverse of
that node’s average distance to all other nodes of the same graph. A high
closeness centrality indicates that the respective node is closely connected to
all other graph nodes [25].
Rationale: High connectivity with other nodes indicates a node manipulating
or infecting other system resources like processes or executable binaries. Such
behavior is typical for viruses like Parite that replicate by infecting other
processes and binaries. This leads to a close connectivity of the corresponding
malware process node with other process and binary file nodes.
Computation:
φ4(n,G) :=
|N | − 1∑
n′∈N\{n}
dψ(n, n′, G)
2. Betweenness Centrality φ5 ∈ Φg of a node n ∈ N represents the relative
portion of all shortest paths between all possible pairs of nodes of a graph
that pass through that specific node n. A high betweenness centrality means
that one specific node is part of a multitude of “communications” between
nodes [25].
Rationale: This metric captures how often a process is part of a multi-step
interaction or data flow between other system resources. This is useful to
identify malware aiming at man-in-the-middle attacks to e.g. intercept the
communication of a benign process with a socket, or to manipulate the infor-
mation that a benign process reads into memory, to e.g. infect that process
with malicious code at runtime.
Computation: The function sp(x, y,G) returns the number of shortest paths
between the nodes x and y in a graph G; spz(x, y,G) the ones that pass
through node z.
φ5(n,G) :=
∑
n′,n′′∈N :n 6=n′ 6=n′′
spn(n
′, n′′, G)
sp(n′, n′′, G)
3.2 Training and Model Building Phase
We can now establish statistical profiles for the discrimination between benign
and potentially malicious process nodes in a graph. A concrete instantiation
of this training procedure with real-world data will be discussed in §4.2. The
training procedure consists of four activities: i) event log generation; ii) graph
generation; iii) feature extraction; iv) classifier training.
Event Log Generation Using a user mode Windows API monitor from the
literature [33], we log a defined amount of calls of processes to the Windows
API to capture the activity and interaction of all processes within a system for
a certain period of time. The monitor intercepts process calls to the Windows
API and stores data flow relevant information like event name, parameter values,
and name of the issuing process along with additional context information like
a time-stamp to an event log.
Graph Generation We then extract the data flow related information from
the event logs. This is done by an event data flow interpreter component that
maps raw events to the semantic model discussed in §2.2. The graph builder
then generates one QDFG per event log as described in §2.1. In order to reduce
noise, instead of storing the complete QDFG for training, we generate so-called
reachability graphs for all process nodes in the base QDFGs. Such reachability
graphs contain all nodes and edges that are directly or indirectly connected to
the starting node. By this means we ensure, that the training graphs only contain
activities that are actually triggered by a certain process or of processes that it
directly or indirectly influenced, ignoring all activities that are conducted by
non-related processes.
Feature Extraction The feature extractor computes all graph features from
§3.1 for all process nodes of the graphs in the training graph repository. This
yields a set of feature values for different benign and malicious process. Recall
that we labeled the known malicious process and thus also the corresponding
graph nodes. We are hence able to label the resulting process node feature sets
as belonging to a known malicious/benign process, which is a necessary precon-
dition for later using a supervised machine learning algorithm.
Classifier Training After the feature extraction phase, we feed the obtained
features into a machine learning algorithm for training.
For this we construct a feature vector for each process node of the training set,
with the elements of the vector being the considered QDFG metrics (see §3.1),
together with one label element representing the known classification (benign or
malign) of the respective process. Each feature vector is thus of size |Φ|+ 1.
Note that we only compute feature vectors for process nodes as we are solely
interested in determining whether a specific process that originated from a exe-
cuted binary is malicious or not; we thus do not classify a binary itself, but its
runtime representation, i.e. the respective process or its children.
Considering the high number and diversity of the value space of the selected
training features we need a machine learning algorithm that is robust towards
training set diversity and scales well with respect to the number or training
features. Initial attempts to use simple classifiers like naive Bayes yielded poor
performance in terms of detection precision. We hence explored more complex
algorithms like support vector machines and meta-learners. Particularly good
results were achieved with the Random Forest (RF) algorithm. RF is a meta- or
ensemble-learner, which means that it uses several distinct, potentially imprecise,
classification models and merges their decisions to form a more precise combined
decision. RF constructs many individual decision trees, called decision forest,
based on random selection of limited feature subsets of the feature space.
3.3 Detection Phase
We now have a classifier that can predict the class (malicious or benign) of
an unknown process node based on its characteristic local and global graph
features. In a nutshell for the detection phase we thus only need to build a graph
of a potentially infected system at runtime based on captured events, compute
the characteristic features for each process node in the graph, and match the
resulting feature set against the classifier.
Like for the training phase, we intercept relevant system events at runtime,
interpret them in terms of their data flow semantics, and then build the corre-
sponding (reachability) QDFGs for each process. We then compute the charac-
teristic feature sets for the process nodes of the generated reachability graphs
and match them against the classifier, using the classification model that was
generated as result of the training phase.
Consequently, all process nodes of these reachability graph are classified into
benign or potentially malicious ones.
4 Evaluation
We implemented the detection framework and captured activities of a repre-
sentative and diverse set of known benign and malicious software to assess the
effectiveness and efficiency of our approach.
4.1 Prototype
Our prototype is a distributed system as shown in Figure 3. We used and ex-
tended a user mode Windows API runtime monitor [33] to intercept system
activities relevant in terms of data flows of all processes running within the
evaluation system. For the training phase we used the Random Forest imple-
mentation of the Weka machine learning framework [15], configured to build a
forest of 10 distinct decision trees using the a random feature subsets.
To be able to analyze a large body of malware samples it was necessary
to automate the different analysis steps. For this purpose we customized the
open-source malware sandbox framework Cuckoo 1 by replacing its function call
hooking module with our hooking module. Each Cuckoo sandbox VirtualBox
instance was running a clean installation of Windows 7 SP1 and assigned two
2,4GHz cores and 2GByte of RAM. The generation of the QDFGs, computation
of the corresponding graph features, and the classification of process samples
performed on a 2,8GHz quadcore i7 system with 8GByte of RAM.
1 http://www.cuckoosandbox.org/
4.2 Effectiveness
As data source for our experiments we used 6994 different known malicious
programs and 513 different known benign applications.
The malicious program samples were taken from a subset of the Malicia mal-
ware data set, i.e. all samples that were executable in the considered evaluation
environment, that comprises of real-world malware samples from more than 500
drive-by download servers [24]. The respective malware set consists of samples
from 12 malware families, including families like zeus, spyeye, and ramnit.
The goodware set was composed of a selection of popular applications from
http://download.com and a wide range of standard windows programs, includ-
ing popular email programs like ThunderBird, browsers like FireFox, video and
graphics tools like Gimp, or VLC Player, and security software like Avast.
We generated about 7500 event logs and converted them into QDFGs, each
capturing activities of the sandbox machines for a time interval of 5 minutes.
With this data and the procedure explained in the previous section we ob-
tained a total of 8648 (i.e. 1654 goodware and 6994 malware) QDFG feature
sets. The reason for the set of goodware features being bigger than the set of
executed goodware samples is that for each execution of a goodware sample we
did not only capture the behavior of the goodware sample itself, but also the
interaction with all simultaneously running standard Windows processes.
To evaluate the detection performance of our approach on the obtained fea-
ture set we first performed ten times a 10-fold cross validation test. For this tests
we split the entire feature set into two parts, using 90% of the set for training
and the remaining 10% for testing. The sets were randomly generated and the
splitting repeated 10 times for each test to limit bias from specific set composi-
tions. For each run we built a classification model on basis of the training data
and used it for classifying the remaining test set. To avoid training bias due
to unbalanced feature sets we in addition applied a SMOTE oversampling [8]
on the training sets to approximately balance the distribution of malware and
goodware samples. To express the effectiveness, we computed the following qual-
ity metrics. True positives (TP) refer to malware samples (MW) that have been
correctly classified as malicious, true negatives (TN) to goodware samples (GW)
that were correctly classified as benign, false positives (FP) to goodware sam-
ples incorrectly classified as malicious, and false negatives (FN) malware samples
that were mistakenly labeled as benign:
Detection Rate (DR) : TPMW False Positive Rate (FPR) :
FP
GW
Precision : TPTP+FP F-Measure :
2∗TP
2∗TP+FP+FN
Table 1 (a) depicts the average effectiveness quality metrics of the cross
validation experiments. As we can see, our approach at average can correctly
detect 98 % of the provided malware set with a low false positive rate of only
about 0.5%. The low standard deviations furthermore indicates a good stability
of the results.
a) Real b) Fixed c) Random
Avg. Det. Rate
(Std. Dev.)
98.01%
(σ = 0.51%)
98.00%
(σ = 0.57%)
95.23%
(σ = 0.90%)
Avg. FP Rate
(Std. Dev.)
0.48%
(σ = 0.34%)
0.85%
(σ = 0.35%)
1.08%
(σ = 0.41%)
Precision 99.62% 99.32% 99.12%
F-Measure 98.81% 98.65% 97.13%
Table 1: Effectiveness Quality Metrics
Impact of Quantities To evaluate our hypothesis, that the consideration of
quantities has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the classification, we
performed two more tests. For the first test we replaced the real quantities asso-
ciated to the edges of the QDFGs with a globally fixed value of 1. For the second
test we performed the edge quantity replacement by associating varying random
quantities to the edges. With this we effectively destroyed the inherent quan-
titative information of the QDFGs. For both experiments we again performed
10-fold cross validation tests to ensure stability of the results. Table 1 (b) and
(c) depicts the average detection and false positive rates for both settings.
To calculate the relative impact of quantities on the detection effectiveness we
divided the false positive and false negative rate (which is the dual of the detec-
tion rate) for the fixed and randomized quantities experiment by the respective
rates of the experiment with the real quantities.
As we can see, fixing the quantities to a constant value increases the false
positives by a factor of 1.8 ( .0085.0048 ). For the randomized quantities experiment
we could observe an even bigger loss of effectiveness. Here the false positives
increased by a factor of 2.3 ( .0108.0048 ), while also the false negatives increased by a
factor of 2.4 ( 1−.95231−.9801 ) with respect to the experiments with the actual quantities.
These observations thus support the hypothesis about the utility of quanti-
tative information for malware detection. To verify the statistical significance of
these finding we performed a two-tailed t-test on the detection and false posi-
tive rates of the different experiments. The resulting p-values were all far below
0.01%, which indicates a high statistical significance of our observation.
Ability to Detect New Malware For evaluating our second hypothesis, i.e.
that we are able to detect new malware, we performed an additional classification
experiment. For each experiment run we split our data set into two parts. The
first part, which we used for training, contained all goodware samples and the
samples of all malware families except for one. The second set correspondingly
contained all samples from the remaining family and was used as test set.
With this strategy we ensured that the training set did not contain any
samples from the same family that was used for testing. In consequence the
classifier could not gain any knowledge about the to be classified malware family.
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Fig. 4: Detectability of new malware
With this test procedure we simulated the real-world scenario that our ap-
proach faced a sample from a new malware type that was never seen before and
thus could not be used for training the detection model.
Figure 4 depicts the detection rates that could be achieved for the different
malware families. Each bar shows the percentage of all malware samples of a
specific family that could be detected using a classifier that was trained on the
samples from the remaining malware families.
As we can see, our approach in all cases was able to detect samples from
unknown malware families. On average our approach was able to correctly iden-
tify 73.68% of the new malware samples; some malware families could even be
classified with 100% correctness. These results for this experiment supports our
hypothesis that our approach is capable of detecting new unknown malware and
goodware. Although further investigation is needed to understand why, we spec-
ulate that this is the case because malware behavior is often not too different,
even between distinct malware families.
Obfuscation Resilience Approaches that obfuscate the binary image of mal-
ware through build-time code encryption and run-time decryption or code diver-
sification barely have any influence on the detectability through behavior-based
detection approaches as such code transformations typically do not alter the ex-
ternally observable program behavior. In consequence, our approach is likely to
be widely robust to such used code obfuscation. This assumption is supported by
the ability of our approach to detect variants of malware families that were ob-
fuscated through code transformations. Our evaluations for instance show that
we were able to detect 96 of 101 variants of the Harebot trojan from our data
set, which is known to employ different forms of code obfuscation.
On the other hand, if malware e.g. non-deterministically executes bogus non-
malicious activities or randomly alters between semantically equivalent system
calls to achieve the same behavior, it can effectively trick common behavioral
approaches that base on n-grams profiling and re-identification as consequence
on the unpredictable diverse resulting n-grams as we will show in the following.
The same holds for most call-graph based approaches as call-graphs can be easily
obfuscated by altering or reordering system calls.
Our approach is by construction more robust against call reordering or sub-
stitution approaches. This is because reordering of system calls does not alter
the corresponding QDFGs, and because semantic substitutions of system calls
typically exhibit similar data flow properties that result in similar QDFG up-
dates. Moreover, the injection of bogus calls can change QDFGs, in particular if
new edges are created in consequence of e.g. previously untouched system enti-
ties being read or written to, or if certain operations are repeated such that the
edge weights are altered.
To evaluate the absolute effects of different types of behavioral obfuscation
techniques on the effectiveness of our approach we thus set up a series of addi-
tional experiments.
First, we picked a set of 100 malware and 100 goodware samples as baseline
for our experiments. To reason about the obfuscation resilience of our approach
and related behavioral detection approaches like n-gram based ones we then
step-wise applied behavioral obfuscation transformations on the call traces of
these samples to achieve two typical types of behavior obfuscation, namely re-
ordering of calls and injection of bogus calls. We did so by applying a behavior
obfuscation tool [2] to the baseline malware set. This tools obfuscates commodity
malware by randomly reordering its issued, or injecting new, system calls.
To investigate the effect of increasing degree of behavior obfuscation, we re-
peated these obfuscation steps 360 times with different configurations for call
reordering and injection probabilities, as well as different upper bounds for to
be reordered or injected calls. We represented the degree of obfuscation as Lev-
enshtein Distance between the obfuscated and the non-obfuscated baseline call
traces. More specifically, we computed the average number of insertions, dele-
tions, and substitutions needed to transform the non-obfuscated call traces into
the respectively obfuscated ones. To also get a relative comparison with other
behavioral, raw system call based detection approaches, we conducted these ex-
periments with measuring both, the detection effectiveness of our approach and
the effectiveness of a typical behavioral detection approach based on n-grams
of unordered system calls without arguments with varying n-gram sizes as e.g.
discussed in [6].
As we can see in Figure 5, the ability of the n-gram based approach to
correctly identify malicious processes significantly dropped with increasing ob-
fuscation degree. In particular, higher-order n-grams seem to be more sensitive
to behavioral obfuscation than lower-order ones. In contrast to n-gram based
approaches, our approach seems to be considerably more robust and stable to-
wards behavioral obfuscation. While the effectiveness of the n-gram approaches
quickly dropped quadratically and lost prediction stability when obfuscation
transformations where applied, the effectiveness of our approach at the same
time remained rather stable and only slowly dropped linearly.
In sum, our evaluation indicates that we are rather robust with respect to
realistic behavior obfuscation such as random bogus call injection or reordering,
whereas we could show that common n-gram based approaches are considerably
challenged by such obfuscation techniques.
0,75
0,80
0,85
0,90
0,95
1,00
200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360
D
e
te
ct
io
n
 R
at
e 
Obfuscation Degree / Levenshtein Distance 
3-grams
4-grams
5-grams
6-grams
7-grams
Poly. (3-grams)
Poly. (4-grams)
Poly. (5-grams)
Poly. (6-grams)
Poly. (7-grams)
(a) n-gram classifier
0,75
0,80
0,85
0,90
0,95
1,00
200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360
D
e
te
ct
io
n
 R
at
e
 
Obfuscation Degree / Levenshtein Distance 
QDFG
(b) QDFG metric classifier
Fig. 5: Obfuscation experiments
4.3 Efficiency
The generation of Random Forest classification models took between 55.21 and
75.38 seconds. The size of the generated models was between 16 and 19 MBytes.
As the training and model generation phase is only conducted once, this overhead
does not contribute to the overhead during the detection phases.
As we can see in Figure 6 the overall detection time seems to increase quadrat-
ically with respect to the graph size. The bottom-most part of the area stack
refers to the time it took to generate a QDFG from a given event log, the area on
top of that indicates the time needed to compute the local graph metrics, and
the top-most area expresses the time spent for computing the global metrics.
This is not surprising, as most graph algorithms such the used centrality metrics
have a theoretical complexity of O(n2) to O(n3), with n being the number of
nodes in the graph [5]. On the other hand, the overhead for graph generation
and computation of local features only grows linearly with respect to the graph
size. The overhead induced by matching the generated graph features against
the classification model was below the evaluation precision threshold of 1 ms
and thus ignored for this analysis as it has no noticeable impact on the overall
overhead. The size of the QDFGs used for our evaluation ranged from 47 to 330
edges resulting in an overall detection time between 24ms and 412ms. On aver-
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Fig. 6: Computation Time vs. Graph Complexity
age, generating a QDFG, computing its local and global features, and matching
it against the trained classifier took 71.213ms.
4.4 Summary and threats to validity
In sum, we have shown our approach to be highly effective; to yield these results,
among other things, on the basis of quantities; to be able to detect malware
families for which it has not been trained; to be robust w.r.t. obfuscation – in
particular more robust than n-grams; and to be efficient.
Naturally, these results need to be put in the context of our study. The
evaluation results were obtained on the basis of a proof-of-concept prototype
with event logs generated in a controlled lab environment. The obtained insights
might not generalize to the application of our approach in real-world settings.
We tried to limit the risk of over-fitting the model to specific sub-sets of
the training data by pro-actively diversifying the training set by selecting a wide
and diverse range of popular malware and goodware samples for our training set.
Furthermore, the fact that our cross-validation results show a very low standard
deviation supports the assumption that we did not over-fit our models.
We executed and sampled the evaluation malware in a virtualized sandbox
environment. It is known that modern malware often includes functionality to
detect virtualization. There hence is a risk that we train our classification models
on unrealistic malware behavior and thus are not able to detect their behavior
in real-world scenarios. Even though we did not explicitly address this threat,
for the future we plan to generate malware event data on realistic bare-metal
environments and re-run the experiments to find out if this has any effect on the
performance of our approach.
Because current malware still mainly focuses on avoiding detection by signature-
based approaches, it rarely employs advanced behavior obfuscation techniques.
Although we applied as much randomization as possible for our obfuscation it
can of course not be excluded that the simulations do not adequately reflect
real-world obfuscation techniques, or that adversaries might come up with more
complex behavioral obfuscation operators.
5 Related Work
While behavior-based detection algorithms can still not be considered standard
for commercial products, they have a long history in academia, especially in the
intrusion detection domain. We do not perform a full literature survey on this
topic here but focus on dynamic behavior-based malware detection.
A seminal idea of Forrest et al. [11] for behavior-based analysis was to profile
benign and malign processes on the basis of characteristic system call sequences
(n-grams). This approach was later refined and combined machine learning meth-
ods to improve classification effectiveness [21,14,19,23,31]. Similar ideas were also
used to classify malware w.r.t. behavioral similarities [1,28,29].
Our system also intercepts and processes system calls. However, while the
previously mentioned approaches directly use sequences of raw system calls, we
use a data flow abstraction of these calls. This distinction is important as ap-
proaches that base on raw system call data are often significantly challenged by
malware that use behavioral obfuscation techniques [4,30,35]. Such obfuscations
for example target at breaking n-gram based approaches by reordering or ran-
domizing system call sequences. As we base our analysis on a (quantitative) data
flow abstractions of the system calls, which is independent of sequence order, our
approach is, by construction, more robust to such obfuscation attempts.
Besides those detection approaches that use non-interpreted sequences of
raw system calls, a separate line of research performs intermediate interpretation
steps. A common approach is to extract semantic dependencies between different
system calls of a process to form characteristic profiles for known goodware and
malware. Popular examples represent system call dependency profiles in form of
data or control flow graphs [18,26,13,20], or assign high-level semantics to known
graphs [10,9,27]. (Sub-)graphs that pertain to known malicious behavior are then
used to re-identify malicious behavior of system processes at runtime. Due to
the used intermediate abstraction steps such approaches also appear more robust
to behavioral obfuscation attempts. Unfortunately, they are also challenged in
terms of identifying previously unknown malicious behavior for which detection
profile graphs have not yet been extracted.
In particular, from the data flow perspective, close to ours is the work of Park
et al. [26]. They construct Data Flow Graphs based on system calls, where enti-
ties are processes, child processes and files. Based on the DFGs of variants of a
given malware family, they compute a common sub-graph called a HotPath. This
process can be repeated for sets of variants of different malware families, and the
resulting sub-graphs can be used to classify the DFG of a given process: it will be
a variant of a known malware family if it contains a similar sub-graph or good-
ware otherwise. Different from our work, they do not consider quantities in their
graph representation (which we have shown to be an important discriminating
factor) and by construction their approach is tailored to recognize mutations of
known malware families. They discuss the robustness of their approach against
similar obfuscation techniques as the ones we consider, but opposed to our work
their approach is challenged by the injection of arbitrary bogus system calls.
Other approaches [34,17] share similar drawbacks, as they depend on explicit
definitions of malicious behavior. Our approach in contrast does not rely on fixed
detection patterns. Due to the generic high-level nature of the used data flow
graph features, it is more likely to also be able to detect new attacks and mali-
cious behavior that deviate from the ones that were used for training. The use of
statistical graph-based metrics for detection instead of fixed data flow patterns
also differs from previous work on malware detection through quantitative data
flow graphs [32]. The main difference to related work that leverage taint analysis
for anomaly-based malware detection [3,7] is that we leverage quantitative data
flow aspects without using comparably expensive taint tracking.
The recently published work of Jang et al. [16] relates to our work in that
they also leverage graph metrics to discriminate malware from goodware. But, in
contrast to our work, they base the computation of those metrics on system call
dependency graphs, while our model is based on quantitative data flow graphs.
As we could show, this abstraction increases the robustness towards behavioral
obfuscation which gives us better resilience than approaches that directly base
on raw system calls. Mao et al. [22] also leverage graph metrics on system entity
dependency graphs for malware detection. Similarly, in contrast to us they do
not incorporate any quantitative flow information for which we could show that
it has an considerable impact on detection precision.
In sum, the main technical difference between our work and related contribu-
tions is that we leverage QDFG features rather than raw system calls or system
entity dependency graphs. This makes our approach fast and robust against com-
mon types of behavioral obfuscations, and, due to the additional quantitative
dimension, we achieve a good detection precision.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We have presented a novel approach to perform graph metric based malware de-
tection on the basis of quantitative data flow analysis. We intercept system calls
issued by system processes, interpret them in terms of their data flow semantic
and build quantitative data flow graphs. These are used to identify graph nodes
that represent potentially malicious system processes.
To this extent, we compute sets of characteristic graph features, such as
centrality metrics, for each process node in the graph to discriminate between
benign and potentially malign nodes through a machine learning classifier. Using
this classifier, trained on feature sets of known goodware and malware, we are
able to discriminate unknown process samples.
It is difficult to objectively compare the effectiveness of different malware
detection approaches presented in literature, due to varying evaluation base-
lines and used assessment procedures. However with respect to closely related
dynamic malware detection approaches [34,18,13], our approach has similar or
better detection effectiveness, while achieving a significantly better efficiency.
In contrast to previous QDFG-based work [32] and related rule-based ap-
proaches [34], our approach is able to detect novel malware samples that exhibit
unknown behavior with better detection effectiveness and efficiency. In compar-
ison to related metric-based approaches [16,22] we could show that the quanti-
tative aspect significantly improves detection precision.
Moreover, we have shown that our approach is robust to certain classes of be-
havioral obfuscation: by construction the order of system calls is irrelevant, since
they produce the same QDFGs, and more interestingly, random injection of sys-
tem calls that potentially modify both the structure and the original quantities
does not significantly alter the detection effectiveness either.
In conclusion, we showed the usefulness of quantitative data flows for mal-
ware detection and established a foundation for further research in the area of
QDFG based malware detection models. We plan to perform further tests on
the robustness of our approach, try to generalize our approach to non-sandbox
settings, and to improve effectiveness through additional graph features.
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